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continued to exercise corporate powers after their term of duration
has expired. Under this statute a corporation which has so continued in business is deemed to have had a continuous legal existence as
a corporation and all its acts are thereby validated. It would therefore seem that the so called revival provision is little more than an
extension. There are authorities 23 which recognize a corporation as
de facto if it continues in business after the expiration of its charter.
There is no other legal basis on which to place the retroactive effect
of Section 49 than on the theory of de facto existence after the expiration of the charter. In a New York case 24 where a corporation
continued in business for three years after its alleged dissolution, it
was estopped to set up its dissolution as a ground for dismissing an
action against it for the performance of an executory contract to which
it had become a party after its dissolution. The reason for the estoppel was based upon the ground that the other party, a private individual, was not chargeable with constructive notice of the expiration
date of the corporate charter, and so was not in pari delictu with the
corporation. It may be said that the better legal basis for the nunc
pro tunic provision of the present revival statute seems to be the de
facto doctrine. This doctrine should be employed as to permit flexibility in working out the real equities of contending parties, and, if
possible, the rights of stockholders should be further protected by
legislation.
There are already some sixteen other states 25 in which corporate
revival statutes have proven successful without much litigation. This
may be ascertained from the lack of reported decisions in this field.
JOHN E. PERRY.
AN ACTION FOR THE REMOVAL OF ENCROACHING STRUCTURES.-

An action may be maintained by the owner of any legal estate in land
for an injunction directing the removal of a structure encroaching on
such land. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as limiting
the power of the court in such action to award damages in an appropriate case in lieu of an injunction or to render such other judgment
as the facts may justify.
23 Brady v. Delaware Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Penne. 415, 45 Ad. 345
(Del. 1899) ; Bushnell v. Consolidated Ice Machine Co., 138 Ill. 67, 27 N. E. 596
(1891) ; Campbell v. Perth Amboy Mut. Loan, Homestead & Bldg. Ass'n, 76 N. J.
Eq. 347, 74 At. 144 (1909). However, there is contrary authority which holds

that after a corporation is dissolved by judicial decree, or by the expiration of
the period fixed for its existence in the law under which it was organized, it is
not even a de facto corporation. Clark v. American Coal Co., 165 Ind. 213,
73 N. E. 1083 (1905) ; Knights of Pythias v. Weller, 93 Va. 605, 25 S. E. 891
(1896) ; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Rector, 124 Ark. 90, 186 S. W. 622 (1916);
Venable Bros. v. Southern Granite Co., 135 Ga. 508, 69 S. E. 822 (1910).
24 Wilkins v. Sirael Realty Corp., 174 Misc. 1002, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 1017
(1940).
25 Report of the Law Revision Commission, LEGIs. Doc. No. 65(1) (1943).
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This section shall not be deemed to repeal or modify any existing statute or local law relating to encroaching structures.'
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaran2
teed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever.
In each of the following actions an issue of fact must be tried by
a jury unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is directed . . .
2. An action in ejectment . . .3
The word "action" refers to a civil action; . . . the words "an

action of ejectment"
to an action to recover the immediate possession
4
of real property.
There is only one form of civil action. The distinction between
actions at law and suits in equity and the forms of those actions and
suits have been abolished. 5
Quaere: If the defendant in an action for the removal of an
encroaching structure disputes title, will he be entitled to a jury trial?
The enactment of Section 539 of the Real Property Law was
proposed by the Law Revision Commission. 6 It appears from the
report of the Commission that the purpose of the enactment is to give
to an owner of a legal estate, in cases of encroachment, the right to
bring an action for an injunction directing removal, thereby restoring
the rule which long prevailed in New York until7 it was brought into
question by the decision in Syracuse v. Hogan.
The question whether a mandatory injunction is a proper remedy
against encroaching structures appeared to have been settled in
New York by the case of Baron v. Korn,8 where thirty-two years
before the decision in Syracuse v. Hogan the Court of Appeals, in
granting the injunction, said:
Again, it would be impracticable, if not impossible, for the plaintiffs in
ejectment to regain actual possession of the alley-way occupied by the wall.
The sheriff might not regard it as his duty to deliver possession by taking
down the wall, which would burden him with the risk of injury to other portions of defendant's building, not included within the nine inches. But in
equity, the obligation to remove can be placed directly on the party who caused
the wall to be erected.
In Syracuse v. Hogan,9 however (in which, unlike the above case,
the defendant moved for a jury trial as a matter of right, to determine
disputed title), the Court of Appeals, in reversing the order denying
the defendant's motion (on the ground that it was in essence an action
of ejectment) said:
IN. Y. REAL PROP.

2 N.

LAW

(1942) § 539, subd. 1.

Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 2.
3 N. Y. Civ. PRc. Act § 425.
4 Id. § 7, subd. 8.
5Id. §8.
GN. Y. Law Revision Commission Report, LEGIs. Doc. No. 65(C) (1942).
Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 406 (1923).
8 Baron v. Korn, 127 N. Y. 224, 228, 27 N. E. 804, 805 (1891).
9 See note 7 supra.
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It is suggested that the plaintiff cannot recover in this action all the relief
to which it is entitled if it be held that it is in ejectment. I do not think this
follows . . . If there be involved in such action the expense of . . . the removal of incumbrances, then the expense of such . . . removal . . . may be
recovered . . . and the judgment may be enforced by execution . . . If it cannot be enforced by execution, then the defendant may be punished for contempt
in refusing to comply with the judgment. (. .. C. P. A., sec. 505.) 10

One year later in Johnson v. Purpors," the Appellate Divisiontwo judges dissenting-held that in an action to recover possession of
real property and damages for withholding same, it is error for the
court to include in the judgment an order upon the defendant to
remove the encroachment. Quoting the statement in Syracuse v.
Hogan as to the adequacy of the remedy in ejectment, the court said
that this equitable relief was improper and unnecessary for the protection of plaintiff's rights. Although the question of title had been
settled in favor of the plaintiff by a jury, the mandatory injunction
was denied. "Thus," the Law Revision Commission concludes in
commenting on this case, "the decision of the Court of Appeals in

Syracuse v. Hogan was interpreted as precluding the granting of a
mandatory injunction for the removal of encroaching structures." 12
Whether or not this conclusion on the part of the Commission is
justified,' 3 these opinions certainly raised doubts as to the availability
of this practicable equitable remedy to landowners. There was a
definite need for a remedy. And Section 539 of the Real Property
Law effectively meets this need. There can be no question, now, as
to the right of a land owner to bring an action for a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove an encroaching structureif he is the undisputed "legal owner".
But if the defendant disputes the legal ownership? This has
been the basic, controversy, the root from which the twisted branch of
10

(1942)

See N. Y. Law Revision Commission Report, LEGIs. Doc. No. 65(C)
17-18, for criticism of this interpretation of N. Y. Civil Practice Act

§ 505.
"Johnson v. Purpora, 203 App. Div. 505, 203 N. Y. Supp. 581 (1924).
12N. Y. Law Revision Commission Report, LEGIs. Doc. No. 65(C)
(1942) 16.
13 Hinman, J., in his dissenting opinion in Johnson v. Purpora, 208 App.
Div. 505, 509 (3d Dept. 1924), writes: "There was nothing in the mode of
trial adopted expressly indicating that equitable relief was to be sought ....
The question is whether . . . the pleading and procedure adopted by plaintiff
have been such as to preclude the equitable relief which has been granted in the
judgment....
The plaintiff demanded judgment (1) for possession of said
portion of said premises, (2) for damages for withholding same." The dissenting opinion held that according to the spirit of the reformed practice there
can be no objection to the granting of equitable relief in this case, that there is
now but one form of action and provided the plaintiff alleges and proves some
cause of action, whether at law or in equity, he is entitled to appropriate judgment. The majority opinion, of course, did say that the equitable relief was
unnecessary. But was this why the order was reversed? Or was the reversal,
rather, a result of a narrower construction of the pleadings? Under these
facts, can this decision be said to "preclude the granting of a mandatory
injunction"?
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law in Purpora v. Johnson sprang. The branch has been removed.
But does the statute go to the root of the matter?
In Syracuse v. Hogan the plaintiff, demanding that the defendant le perpetually enjoined from maintaining an encroaching building and that he be ordered to remove the same. had put the action on
the Special Term Calendar for trial. The defendant, who disputed
plaintiff's title, moved to have the action stricken therefrom on the
ground that he was, as a matter of right, entitled to a jury trial. The
Court of Appeals held in favor of the defendant, saying:
... the main issue to be tried is the title to the twenty-nine foot strip.
... The fact that plaintiff has, as an incident to the main question to be determined, asked for equitable relief, does not change the form of the action. The
court looks to substance and not to form . . .The prayer for judgment is not
decisive and does not control the nature of the action ...

It is evident from the Commission's recommendation to the Legislature that Section 539 was proposed to nullify the effect of the
decision in Syracuse v. Hogan, for the reasons stated by Cardozo.
J., in his dissenting opinion in this case:
This is not an action of ejectment. It is an action in equity to enjoin the
obstruction of a highway .... Equitable remedies being necessary for the
attainment of complete relief, there is no rule that a court of equity must wait
until the suitor's title to the land has been first made out at law. Such a rule
there may. once have been. It may still prevail in other states. In this State it
has long been abandoned ....14

But is the language of the enactment sufficiently clear and specific to effect its purpose? Does it settle the controversy that has
been raging since the "union of law and equity", declared by the
codes? I

Is there still not room for the defendant to argue that he

cannot be deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial by legislative fiat? ",
It is obvious that in every case brought under Section 539 the
plaintiff will necessarily be out of possession and the defendant, in
possession. That being so, the Court of Appeals argued in Syracuse
v. Hogan, the action is brought within the statutory definition of an
action in ejectment, which is, "An action to recover the immediate
possession of real property." That being so, may not the defendant
still argue, if he disputes title, that Section 539 was not intended to
apply to a case where the plaintiff's legal ownership is in dispute, and
if it does apply to such a case, it is unconstitutional? Is the language
of the statute sufficiently specific to override the formidable array of
judicial support of his position ?
The inherent and fundamental difference between actions at law
14N. Y. Law Revision Commission Report,
(1942) 6.
Is See note 5 supra.
16 See notes 2, 3 supra.

I-FrI..
Doc. No. 65(C)

1944 ]

CURRENT LEGISLATION

and suits in equity cannot be ignored. 17 The code enables settlement
and granting of equitable relief in one action.' 8 But a litigant cannot
be deprived of a jury trial of those issues which were adjudicated at
law before the adoption of the constitution unless that right has been
waived. 19 When an action is brought to obtain a mandatory injunction for the removal of encroachments, and the determination of the
case involves a question of title, the action may properly be sent to
the law
side of the court as an action of ejectment to be tried by a
20
jury.
That authority is not lacking for the position that the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury does not apply to a case for mandatory injunction because this was always a case for equity and in equity
there was no right to a jury trial, is not to be denied. And this is the
position supported by the Law Revision Commission. 21 But can it
be that in phrasing this statute the Commission drafted it in this
Delphic manner to insure against its being declared unconstitutional?
To date there have been no cases under this section, so we are
free to speculate. Will the New York Court of Appeals follow the2
reasoning of the Supreme Court of California in Angus v. Cravet 2
in its interpretation of a statute authorizing an equity action to quiet
title? This court said:
A case under this Section presents a case for equitable relief. It seeks to

have something done which a court of law cannot do . . . Courts, however, in
guarding the constitutional right to a jury trial, have repeatedly held that where
the suit should have been, and in substance is, an action for the recovery of the
possession of land, the right of a defendant to a jury cannot be defeated by the
mere device of bringing the action in an equitable form. And so it has been
held that the right to a jury trial is not defeated when at the commencement of
the action the defendant and not the plaintiff was in acual possession of the
premises involved . . . but that the action should be treated as substantially an
Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512 (1917).
28 Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135 (1901).
'9 Wheelock v. Lee, 74 N. Y. 495 (1878).
20 Westergreen v. Everett, 218 App. Div. 172, 218 N. Y. Supp. 68 (1926).
2" See N. Y. Law Revision Commission Report, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65(C)
(1942) at 11-12, 22-25, in which the following authorities are cited in support
of this proposition: POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919); Gardner
v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N. Y. 1816), and Smith v. Carll,
5 Johns. Ch. 118 (N. Y. 1821)-cited in support of the proposition that equity
would have settled a disputed title to land at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, before the amalgamation of law and equity. Cf. Broisted v.
South Side R. R. Co., 55 N. Y. 220 (1873); Corning v. Troy Iron & Nail
Factory, 40 N. Y. 191 (1869); Williams v. New York Central Ry. Co., 16
N. Y. 97 (1857); Olmsted v. Loomis, 9 N. Y. 423 (1854). In Wheelock v.
Noonan, 108 N. Y. 179, 187, 15 N. E. 67, 69 (1888), Judge Finch said: "I am
inclined to deem it more a rule of discretion than of jurisdiction"-re the requirement of a separate law action. Carroll v. Bullock, 207 N. Y. 567, 101
N. E. 438 (1913), held that an action for a mandatory injunction requiring
the defendant to remove an encroachment was one in equity and not an action
at law.
22 Angus v. Craven, 132 Cal. 691, 64 Pac. 1091 (1901).
27
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action to recover possession . . . Of course it is true that a court of equity can
hear and determine any issue of fact in a proceeding properly before the court.. . But the circumstance that either kind of court may try a question of fact
has no weight in determining whether, upon a particular state of facts, the
remedy is legal or equitable ...
Or, as is more likely in view of the judicial history behind this
statute, will the New York court follow its reasoning in the decision
of Jamaica Savings Bank v. M. S. Investing Co.. 23 This was an
action to foreclose a mortgage and to receive a deficiency judgment
against the defendant guarantor.
The defendant's contention that since prior to 1830 only an action
at law could have been brought against him, that to deprive him of
his right to trial by jury would be in contravention of Article I, Section 2 of the New York Constitution was repudiated. Citing Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co. V. Nelson,2 4 the court held that since this
is an equitable action, even though as incidental to the main relief
prayed for the complaint also asks for money damages, a separate
trial by jury is not within the realm of the constitutional guaranty.
How the New York courts will construe Real Property Law,
Section 539, remains to be seen. That it effectively removes any
doubts there may have been created by the opinion in Syracuse
v. Hogan as to a land owner's right to the equitable remedy of a
mandatory injunction for the removal of encroaching structures is
conceded. But has it changed the controlling rule of law in that case?
It is submitted that judicial construction or further amendment will
be necessary before a "legal owner", where the defendant disputes his.
title, will be assured of .the availability of Section 539 of the Real
Property Law to protect his rights.
WILHEMINA PAULUS.

N. Y. 215, 8 N. E. (2d) 493 (1937).
Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co. v. Nelson, 8 Hun 21 (N. Y. 1876).
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